As always, when I list holdings from multiple cases, selections are listed in chronological order starting with more recent cases:
In a medical malpractice case, under the traditional doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the presumption of negligence arises after plaintiff has established that the event in question is one that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence; whether plaintiff has established this may be within the common knowledge of a lay person. If not, expert testimony is required. Johnson v. Egtedar, 112 Nev. 428, 915 P.2d 271 (1996).
NRS 41A.100 replaces, rather than supplements, the classic res ipsa loquitur formulation in medical malpractice cases where it is factually applicable. Johnson v. Egtedar, 112 Nev. 428, 915 P.2d 271 (1996).
The very fact that Rentnelli's condition continued to deteriorate after treatment by the Reno doctors, but immediately improved after the Santa Barbara doctors' treatment, would lead a reasonable person to believe that the first doctors did not adequately treat Rentnelli's ailments. Dutt v. Kremp, 894 P.2d 354, 111 Nev. 567 (1995).
As a general rule, a plaintiff must use expert testimony to establish medical malpractice. NRS 41A.100; Jain v. McFarland, 109 Nev. 465, 851 P.2d 450 (1993).
The locality rule is not the standard to be applied to board certified specialists in malpractice actions. Mishler v. Nevada Board of Medical Examiners, 109 Nev. 287, 849 P.2d 291 (1993); Orcutt v. Miller, 95 Nev. 408, 595 P.2d 1141 (1979).